Returns to Education: What Does Over-education Play?

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ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to study returns to education by taking into account of the quality of jobs match held by workers in the manufacturing sector of Malaysia. This type of study is quite rare not only in the country but also across developing nations. Using the second Malaysia Productivity Investment Climate Survey (PICS-2),nearly 20% and 30% of workers employed in jobs for which they are overeducated and undereducated, respectively. Further findings indicate that Over-education is more acute amongst highly-educated workers whilst under-education is more evident for lowly educated workers. By gender, women have a higher proportion of overeducated workers compared to men. Consequently, over-education leads to a lower productivity in terms of earnings. The augmented Mincer earnings equation, i.e. the ORU model clearly show that although returns to surplus education was positive (S^o), the return was lower than the returns to required education (S^r), approximately 6% against 10%. This means that overeducated workers earn significantly lower than their co-workers who are in similar jobs but who have less education, but well matched. Moreover, the ORU model signified that returns to required education was much greater than returns to actual educational attainment. All of these imply that the rate of return to education depends on the allocation of skills over jobs where earnings is not fully embodied but is (partly) determined by job characteristics and/or by the quality of the match between skills supplied by the worker and skills required by the job. Nevertheless, the situation of over-education among highly educated workers in the Malaysian labour market may impede the country's intention to move towards the state of being a high-income country, as outlined in the "New Economic Model" blueprintsince it reduces individuals' productivity.

JEL Classifications: J24, J31

Keyword –Over-education, required education, surplus education

INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to study returns to education by considering the role of the quality of jobs match held by workers in the manufacturing sector of Malaysia. This type of study is quite rare not only in the country but also across developing nations.[1]Over-education can be defined as workers who have higher schooling than what their jobs require while those with lower schooling than what is required are considered 'undereducated'. Malaysia is an interesting case in its own right. It is a middle income country which has, since the 1970s, moved from being a primary goods exporter to one that is much more reliant on manufacturing and services. Education has played a pivotal role in this transformation with higher levels of investment and educational attainment (UNDP, 2009). The expenditure on education as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Malaysia has increased from 4% in 1970 to 6 % in 2009 (Cheong et al., 2011). This compares favourably with a number of developed countries such as the UK, USA, Japan and also Singapore (2.9% to 5.5% in 2005) (UNDP, 2009). There has been a significant increase in enrolments at the tertiary level where between 1995 and 2005, the total number of students in tertiary education at degree level increased by over 200% (MOHE, 2009).As a result, the number of graduates produced by public HEIs has tremendously increased, from

[1] The main explanation revolves around the paucity of data in developing countries; in particular, there is a lack of information regarding the education or skills required to perform or obtain a job (Mehta et al., 2011).

62,990[2] in 1985 to 392,552 in 2005, an increase of 5.23 times. This helps to improve the quality of the workforce - by 2010, the percentage of the labour force with tertiary education had increased to 24%, more than three times higher than it was in 1985, about 7%. While universities continue to mass-produce, inevitably, questions have been raised about the quality of job held by workers in the labour market (World Bank, 2009). Despite this, to date no study has addressed the utilisation of education and skills in the Malaysian labour market.

There are two main objectives in this paper. First, we document the extent of over-education. Second, we investigate the effect of over-education on individuals' earnings. In doing so, this paper is organised as follows. Section 2focuses on a review of the mismatch literature in Malaysia. Section 3 provides a very brief overview of some theoretical perspectives on mismatch. Section 4 outlines the data by mainly focusing on the measurement and the incidence of over-education while section 5 details empirical estimation methods. Section 6 highlights the results of the effects of over-education, and the final section concludes.

MISMATCH IN MALAYSIA

There are very little study identify mismatch in Malaysia. However, few reports highlight the mismatch issue, the earliest of which dates back to the late 1980s. In a study on higher education and employment in Malaysia, UngkuAbdul Aziz et al. (1987) highlight the issue of job mismatch among workers with a tertiary and post-secondary qualification. Using their own survey data collected between 1981 and 1983, the relevance of individuals' educational background and their jobs was assessed by the degree to which their education was perceived as useful to their present jobs. Based on a scale of three ('very relevant,' 'relevant' and 'not relevant'), their study revealed that about 6% and 12% of workers, respectively, with a post-secondary and tertiary education were in jobs that did not relevant with their qualifications. By gender, the mismatch was even more pronounced among female workers (15% overall) than among the men (11% overall). Furthermore, a large proportion of mismatched workers were from the arts, economics and social sciences backgrounds. By sharp contrast, nearly 100% of the graduates in medicine, engineering and architecture found their courses to be very useful. Yet, no further analysis was done to examine whether gender and field of education play a significant role in the job matching process.

A study conducted by MorshidiSirat et al. (2003) provides some evidence regarding the quality of job match held by graduates. Although the main focus of the study was graduate employability amongst bachelor degree holders from public HEIs, their report reveals that at least 31% of graduates from the 2001 cohort were employed in jobs that were not relevant to their fields of study. Furthermore, over 35% of graduates worked in jobs outside of their academic qualifications. The mismatch phenomenon was also highlighted in "*Employability Profiles of Graduate 2006-2008: The Malaysian Scenario*" (Rohana et al., 2009). The report reveals that the mismatch phenomenon was lower among individuals with post-graduate qualifications (Ph.D and master's degree) as opposed to a bachelor's degree. Only 0.6 to 1.4% of respondents with a PhD qualification and 6 to 7% graduated with a master's degree employed in non-professional and managerial occupational group.20 In contrast, 34 to 36% of those with a bachelor's degree ended up in jobs below their qualification (i.e., working at technical, clerical and sales occupational levels).

Annie and Hamali (2006), Lim et al. (2008) and Ishak et al. (2008) focused on particular public HEIs when examining the job quality of graduates in the labour market. Annie and Hamali (2006), for instance, explored employability amongst graduates with a Diploma in Business and Administration (DBA) from the Mara University of Technology (UiTM), Sarawak branch. Among the main issues concerned the appropriateness of graduate employment, which was based on discrepancies between the graduates' skills and the requirements of the job market. The authors note that the DBA graduates were trained to take up semi-professional jobs at mid-level management and administration levels. The findings indicated that about 10% of graduates were engaged in a professional job, whilst 41% were engaged in jobs matching their diploma qualifications (i.e., administration occupations). About 49% were in positions that required levels of educational attainment lower than a diploma, and hence were overeducated.

Lim et al. (2008) investigated labour market outcomes among recent graduates from University Utara Malaysia. Graduates in the survey were asked about their current labour market situation and four labour market outcomes were observed: unemployment, part-time job, full-time job commensurate with qualifications and full-time job not commensurate with qualifications. The authors

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[2] Both diploma and degree qualifications at public universities

found that 34.1% of respondents surveyed were unemployed, 28.4% were employed in a full-time job commensurate with qualifications, a further 28% were in jobs not commensurate with qualifications and the remaining 9.5% were in part-time employment. By field of study, their results indicatethat accounting graduates have better labour market achievements relative to other graduates: 57% were employed in jobs that corresponded to their degree, while only 18% were in positions that did not require their degree. In contrast, 49% of economics graduates were employed in jobs that did not match their qualifications relative to 22% who were in employment in line with their degree.

Ishaket al. (2008) analysed job match quality among bachelor degree holders from UniversitiKebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) between 1998 and 2002. The authors found that 70% of respondents were employed in jobs corresponding to their actual qualifications, while 30% were employed in jobs that did not match their actual qualifications. By field of study, half of graduates with social sciences background were employed in jobs for which their actual qualifications were unnecessary, whereas all medicine and dental graduates were in jobs that matched their qualifications.

Empirical evidence of the incidence, causes and outcomes of the mismatch phenomenon is scarce not only in Malaysia but also in developing countries. Only three studies have focused on developing countries: one undertaken by Quinn and Rubb (2006) in Mexico and Mehta et al. (2011) who covered Mexico, India, the Philippines and Thailand. As noted in the previous chapter, the reason for this scarcity of studies is due to a lack of information on the number of years of schooling required to perform a given job. Most labour force surveys in developing countries collect education data by the stage of the school system completed, rather than by years of schooling (Mehta et al., 2011).

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF OVER-EDUCATION

It is worth noting that there is no single unified and accepted theory regarding mismatch.Instead, there is a reliance on existing theoretical frameworks within labour economics as an explanation of over-education. Here, human capital and career mobility theories focus on the supply side, whilst job competition and assignment approaches focus on the demand side.

Under the human capital theory (Becker, 1964), productivity is a function of human capital (i.e. education, experience, and training) and workers are paid based on the value of their marginal product. Consequently, wages are determined by workers' educational qualifications, experience, and training. Educational mismatch arises if and when an increase in workers' educational attainment is not matched by a rise in the demand for education and this, in turn, leads to a reduction in the relative wage of high-educated workers. From the firm's perspective, falling relative wages would encourage employers to replace the more highly educatedwith low-educated workers and adjust production techniques to take advantage of such cheaper labour. Highly-educated workers are then placed in positions previously filled by low-skilled workers. Mismatch here is transient since firms adjust their production processes while workers reduce their investment in education in response to the lower relative earnings of skilled and/or highly educated workers.

For the career mobility theory (Sicherman and Galor, 1990), overeducation may reflect the inferior quality of education of workers or other human capital deficiencies such as less work experience or lack of training. Highly educated workers may then be willing to accept a job for which they are overeducated in order to accumulate skills that can then be used later to switch to a higher level occupation or position. For example, increased training may allow workers to acquire more firm-specific skills that complement their formal education and so progress towards higher paid positions. This then reduces mismatch.

The job competition theory (Thurow, 1975) offers a demand side explanation of over-education. Central to this is the notion that when workers compete in the labour market for high-wage jobs, this creates a job queue in which jobs are ranked by earnings and a workers position in the queue is determined by relative training costs. Individuals here may invest in more education in order to move up the labour queue. In the extreme, education and skills investment simply places individuals at the front of the queue for jobs, as it signals that the employer will be required to invest less in training. Highly skilled workers may require less training and are therefore ranked at the top of the labour queue.

The assignment theory focuses on the problem of assigning workers to jobs (Sattinger, 1993). The basic premise here is that both supply and demand are relevant, individual performance varies from job to job, and for the economy as a whole, total output depends on how workers are assigned to jobs. The allocation is optimal when workers are allocated top-down in relation to their skills, whereby the least competent are given the simplest jobs and the most competent are placed in the most complex jobs. As a result, highly educated individuals are more likely to be matched with job vacancies

requiring a higher level of education. However, the matching process may not be perfect, for example, when too many workers vie for a specific position. This may lead to some individuals being assigned jobs lower down the hierarchy. In this instance workers may be overeducated, whilst others prove to be undereducated.

DATASET

This study uses data from second survey of the Malaysia Productivity Investment Climate Survey (PICS-2). The PICS-2 which was carried out in 2007 is a workplace survey, a collaborative effort between the World Bank and the Malaysian Government via the Economic Planning Unit and the Department of Statistics. The survey attempts to understand the investment climate faced by enterprises and how this impacts upon business performance, particularly in the manufacturing and business support services sectors.Samples used in this study however arerestrictedto manufacturing sector and respondents who were in full-time employment, aged between 15 and 64 and who reported no missing in earnings. By such restriction, this leaves about 10,302 respondents, of which 54.5% are males and 45.5% across nine major industries.[3]

Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key variables in this analysis. Respondents are on average 34 years old and reported to have had about 11.3 years of schooling attained which is equivalent in Malaysia to upper secondary qualifications. With respect to other human capital variables, respondents on average accumulated about 157 months of work experience, 7.6 (years) job tenure, and nearly 40% had once attended a training course. Large proportions of respondents are Malay, from the central region, small firms and firms that purely domestically-owned. By gender, there are some distinguishes. Women are slightly younger than men (34 versus 36 years) and are slightly better educated with 25% holding higher degree qualifications (both diploma and university qualifications) relative to 20% among men. Men instead have more work experience and job tenure within firms than women (181 months and 9 years respectively vs. 149 months and 7 years respectively).

The main concern about the dataset is how one measured over-education. Over-educationis measured by comparing an individual's actual education with the required education for a particular job. Whilst measuring actual educational attainment is relatively straightforward, acquiring information on the required education level is trickier. Three methods are considered for measuring the required education: subjective, objective, and statistical methods. This paper utilises the subjective method which relies on the worker's own assessment to measure the required education to obtain or do a particular job.[4]In the survey, respondents were asked directly about required education to do their jobsvia the following statements *"According to you, what is the most appropriate level of education for the work you are doing?"*There were seven educational levels to choose from, starting from (1) degree, to (7) no qualification.

As shown in Table 1 (bottom of the table), approximately one in three workers believed that upper secondary qualifications were the most appropriate level of education in doing their job (36%). Diploma was the second most appropriate (21%) and followed by a degree qualification (12%). Bycomparing the survey respondents' educational attainment with the perceived appropriate education required for the job, we derived conventional estimates of over-education. Where an individuals' actual schooling exceeds what the job requires they are considered to be overeducated ($S^a > S^r$). Where an individuals' actual level of education is below that required for the job they are classified as under-educated ($S^a < S^r$). Those whose actual educational attainment is appropriate for the job (i.e. actual and required education are the same) are deemed well-matched ($S^a = S^r$). Years of required education are lower than years of actual schooling attainment (10.7 years against 11.3 years) whereas years of surplus and deficit schooling are approximately 2.6 years each.

The estimates of over-education incidence is shown in Table 1 (bottom panel of the table is 19%, with the corresponding figures of 52% and 30% are adequately matched and undereducated. Whilst a higher proportion of women are overeducated compared to men, the reverse holds for under-education.[5] With respect to earnings across mismatch (bottom panel of Table 1), well-matched

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[3] Nine major industries are food processing, textiles, garments, wood and furniture, chemical and chemical products, rubber and plastics, machinery and equipment, electrics and electronics and motor vehicles and parts.The exact number of workers for the analysis varies due to missing data in some explanatory variables.

[4] See McGuinness (2006) and Oosterbeek and Leuven (2011) for other methods.

[5]Nevertheless, the incidence of over-education in Malaysia seems to be at the lower end of the existing estimates. Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) undertake a meta-analysis based on data from 25 over-education studies and find that the incidence of over-education varies from 10% to 42% with the unweighted average for over-

workers earn higher wages than their overeducated counterparts irrespective of gender. Overeducated workers earn on average RM9.8 per hour compared to RM 12 each for the well-matched and undereducated workers.

One of the so called "stylised facts" within the over-education literature is that over-education seems more prevalent amongst highly-educated workers. The data seems to support this where overeducation is more prevalent amongst the more highly educated (Figure 1) whilst under-education is more evident for lowly educated workers. In addition, there is considerable heterogeneity with respect to the incidence of mismatch across industry. As revealed in Figure 2, the proportion of respondents who are overeducated ranges from as low as 13% (Electrics & Electronics) and as high as 21% (Garments). In contrast, the highest incidence of undereducation is reported in the Machinery & Equipment (35%) industry. This might be due to the fact that this industry faces difficulty in hiring highly educated workers (World bank, 2009).

EMPIRICAL METHODS

The classic specification of the earnings regression is based on the Mincer specification (Mincer, 1974) which generally takes the following form:

$$\ln(w_i) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 X_i + \alpha_2 S + \alpha_3 Exp + \alpha_4 Exp^2 + \varepsilon_i \qquad (1)$$

where ln (w) is a natural logarithm of earnings (hourly), X is a vector of explanatory variables, S is education, Exp is experience and Exp^2 is a quadratic term of potential work experience, and ε is the error term for individual i. Equation (1) suggests that workers' productivity (w) is determined by worker's characteristics, particularly education. There is no distinction made between actual and required years of education which means that any year of education is just as valuable as another. Also, there is no role for demand side factors, where more years of education imply higher earnings.

In contrast, Thurow's model suggests that earnings are wholly determined by demand side factor, i.e. – required education for a given job which means that surplus education has no reward. Instead, the required education for the job wholly determines earnings. The Mincer earnings equation (1) is then augmented by replacing required education for actual schooling. The model then can be written as:

$$In(w) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 S^r + \beta_3 \exp + \beta_4 \exp^2 + \mu \qquad (2)$$

where S^r is the years of education required for a particular job given. Equation (2) tells us that overeducated workers have similar productivity and receive the same wage levels as those workers who are in jobs with the required education level (well matched).

However, following Sattinger's assignment theory (1993), earnings should be treated as a function of both demand and supply side where both required education and actual attained education play an important role on earnings determination. The equation in (1) is augmented so that the earnings equation can be written as:

$$\ln(w) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 S^r + \gamma_2 S^o + \gamma_3 S^u + \gamma_4 \exp + \gamma_5 \exp^2 + \mu \qquad (3)$$

where actual educational attainment (S) is decomposed into years of required education (S^r), years of surplus education (S^o) and years of deficit schooling(S^u) in relation to those necessary to obtain or perform the job. Equation (3) is also known as the 'ORU earnings function' (Over-education, Required and Under-education) (Hartog, 2000).[6,7]Equation (3) tell us that when over-education is measured in

education standing at 23.3%. A recent review by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011), over-education using the subjective method stands at an average over-education rate of 37%.

[6]Years of required (S^r), years of surplus education (S^o)and years of deficit schooling (S^u)are obtained using the following formula (Hartog, 2000):

$$S = S^r + S^o - S^u$$
$$S^o = S - S^r \text{ if } S > S^r$$
$$= 0 \text{ otherwise}$$
$$\text{and}$$
$$S^u = S^r - S \text{ if } S^r > S$$
$$= 0 \text{ otherwise}$$

terms of years of surplus education, then the overeducated are being compared to people doing the same job who are not overeducated and who have less education.

In the majority of studies that utilize the ORU stress that a return to surplus education is generally positive ($\gamma_2 > 0$) but less than the return to required education ($\gamma_1 > \gamma_2$). The return to under-education is usually found negative ($\gamma_3 < 0$), which implies that undereducated workers earn less than adequately educated workers.

Sicherman and Galor (1991) introduced two stylised fact relating to the return to over and under schooling. First, workers in occupations that require less schooling than they actually have (overeducated) earn lower wages than workers with similar levels of schooling who hold jobs that require the level of schooling they have obtained. These overeducated workers, however, earn more than their co-workers who are not overeducated (i.e., who have the required and, therefore, lower schooling). Second, workers in jobs that require more schooling than they have obtained (undereducated) receive higher wages than workers with the same level of schooling who work in jobs that require just their level of schooling. Undereducated workers, however, receive lower earnings that do their co-workers with the required and, therefore, higher schooling. These observations have been made by other authors (e.g., Duncan and Hoffman 1981; Hartog 1986; Rumberger 1987; and Hartog and Oosterbeek 1988). The extent to which these found in Malaysia will be discussed in the next section.

Another useful of equation (3) is it's allow one to test whether returns to education hold for human capital or job competition modelfollowing Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988).As noted earlier, human capital theory arguedthat wages were determined byendowments of human capital (*S* and *X*) and not the demand side factors. As such, the theory predicts a positive return to education which suggests that education increases wages (productivity) in a linear fashion – the higher the educational attainment, the greater the earnings outcome. Job competition model does recognise that earnings that surplus and deficit education has no reward. These imply that the human capital theory holdsif $\gamma_1 = \gamma_2 = -\gamma_3$ and the jobcompetition model appears to be true if $\gamma_2 = \gamma_3 = 0$. Hence, estimation can proceed with Equation (3) testing for human capital and job competition theory as nested hypotheses. If we reject both hypotheses, this means that returns to education depends on both demand and supply sides as argued by the assignment theory.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Table 2 presents the resultsof the wage impacts of over-education. Threespecifications are examined. Specification 1 focuses on basic human capital model whilst Model 2 and 3focus on augmented human capital model to allow the required and surplus education take effects. Looking firstly at Model 1, the results show that the coefficient of individuals' actual educational attainment (*S*) is positive and significant at the 1% level which means that the higher the education attained, the greater the returns to education. Other factors being equal, for each additional year of schooling completed, it increases of 4% individuals' hourly earnings.[8]This is in accordance with other studies in Malaysia (e.g. – Aminah, 1998; Rahmah and Ragayah, 2005; Milonevic, 2006).

In Model 2, we replace *yearsch*with educational required for the job (S^r) as suggested by Thurow's model. As expected, the results show that the coefficient on required education, 0.0704 is positive and statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This means that returns to required education is positive. Other factors being constant, for each year of required education will result in an increase of individuals' hourly earnings by 7% if individuals are allocated to a job where required and attained levels of education are equal ($S^r = S^a$). As a comparison, the return to required education (Model 2) is far greater than the return to actual schooling (Model 1). Does this suggest that job competition model more superior than human capital theory? We will commence upon this later.

In Model 3, we present the ORU specification as proposed by the assignment theory. The coefficients on required and surplus education have a positive sign, about 0.0987 and 0.0549

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[7]An alternative and simpler earnings specification involves a dummy for over-education and under-education in the earnings equation. When using dummy specification, the overeducated are being compared to individuals with the same education but are well matched.

[8]Since the earnings regression specification is in semi-logarithmic form, the percentage point effect (PE) is obtained using the following formula:

$$PE = (e^{\beta - 1}) \times 100, \text{ where } \beta \text{ is the coefficient estimate.}$$

The percentage point effect will be used throughout the discussion in this paper.

respectively, and both are statistically significant at the 1% level. This can be interpreted as returns to required and surplus education are positive.Other factors holding constant, the rate of return to required education is nearly 10% if individuals are allocated to a job where required and attained levels of education are equal. For each year of schooling surplus leads to an increase of earnings by 5%. Though positive, the returns to years of schooling that are above what is needed for the job (S^o) are lower than the returns to required education. This means that workers who are working in occupations that demand less schooling than they actually have (overeducated) get higher wages than their co-workers (holding other characteristics constant) but lower wages than workers with similar levels of schooling who work in jobs in which their schooling equals what is required. Meanwhile, the coefficient on deficit education is negative, -0.0448 showing penalty to educational insufficiency for undereducated workers. This means that undereducated receive lower wages than their co-workers but get more than workers with the same level of schooling who work in jobs that require their level of schooling.

We now discuss briefly the effects of other variables on the determinants of earnings. The coefficient on work experience across all datasets is positive while the estimated coefficient on work experience squared shows a negative sign. This indicates that wage increases with work experience but at a diminishing rate. The coefficient on training is positive and significant meaning that training is positively associated with earnings and this return is found to be higher than the return to experience. The results show that women earn significantly lower than their men counterparts across the three datasets and the earnings gaps is much higher reported for the married respondents. In particular, controlling for other characteristics women earn about 22% less than that of men.For this reason, separate analysis was also undertaken for males and females and these results are presented in Tables 3. Looking at first specification, males earn higher wages than females (approximately 4.3% against 3.0%). Using *t-test,* this difference is found to be statistically significant at 0.01. This result is, however, should be interpreted with caution due to sample selection bias problem, particularly among the women sample. Since female participation is lower than that of males and that the participation decisions will depend on earnings potential, it may be the case that the coefficients of the female earnings equation may be biased by the absence from the labour market of females who would otherwise have lower earnings.Data in hand however does not permit us to employ the selection approach due to lack of potential instruments.[9] For specification 2, the return to required education for females is fairly higher than that for males (10% against 9%). For specification 3, the return to required education is also slightly higher for females, about 10% as compared to 9.3% for males. Nevertheless, the return to surplus education is considerably greater for females than for males. If males end up in a job that less schooling is required than they have available, return for each year of surplus education is about 4.4% compared to 6.3% for females.

As comparison, the return to required, over and deficit schooling are in ranges with those reviewed from Groot and van den Brink (1997), Kiker*et. al*(1997) and McGuinness (2006), Battu (2008) and Oosterbeek and Leuven (2011). These authors reported that the return to a year of required education was ranges from 3.9%-8.6% whilst 4.2%-7% for a year of surplus education. Moreover, those reviews also suggest that return to required education for female outnumbered the male's counterparts, which is in line with the one generated here.

Two stylised facts of returns to over-education and under-education arefound from specification 3across the three samples and this can be simplified in Table 4. First, workers who are overeducated in their job get a higher wages than their co-workers, roughly 4.4% to 6.3% but their earnings are still lower than workers with similar levels of schooling who work in jobs in which their schooling equals what is required, approximately 9.3% to -9.9%.[10]This suggests that there is a pay loss for being an overeducated than a well-matched worker and the pay loss is considerably larger for females than for males. In particular, the penalty for being overeducated is 53% (i.e. the return falls from 9.3 to 4.4%) for males as compared to 37% than of females (the return drops from 10% to 6.3%). Using a Wald test, these differences are statistically significantly from zero at 0.01. This implies that the surplus education are not the result of *potentially* decreasing, instead, it shows a positive and increasing returns on earnings from schooling that exceeded the requirement for the job occupied as found in Sicherman and Galor (1991) and Alba-Ramirez (1993). Second, workers who are undereducated, i.e. jobs that require more schooling than they have receive lower wages than their co-workers, but they get more than workers with the same level of schooling who are well-matched, i.e. -work in jobs that require their level of schooling (-0.0448 against 0.0539[11]). This means thatfor each year of deficit schooling, returns to education will drop by 4.5 percentage points, from 9.9% to 5.4%.

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[9] The model could be identified by functional form alone, though this is not the scope of this paper.

[10] This figure comes from the discrepancy between the surplus and required coefficient (surplus – required).

[11] These figures are obtained by subtracting deficit and required education (0.0987 – 0.0448).

This time, the earnings loss is larger for females than for males (5.5 versus 4.5 percentage points).[12]These observations also have been found in other studies such as in Hartog (1986), Rumberger (1987),Hartog&Oosterbeek (1988)andSicherman and Galor (1991).

To test whether earnings equations are restricted either to equation (1) or to equation (2), we employed an F-test on the residual sum of squares and the results are presented in Table 5. The results show that the hypothesis that returns to education are determined some way either by supply sideor the demand side are rejected at the 1% level regardless of gender. This means that the earnings do not seem to be decided exclusively on the basis of actual schooling attained (Model 1) or required education (Model 2). Instead, earnings are determined by how workers are assigned to their jobs as shown in Model 3, which is superior to both the human capital specification and to the job competition specification. In fact, one would underestimate the rate of return in comparison to properly allocated individuals if they employ either equation (1) or equation (2) because the coefficient on S^r in specification (3) is higher than the coefficient in (1) and (2), applying when $S^o = S^u = 0$. These findings are in line with Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988), Alba-Ramirez (1993), Groot (1996); Kiker et *al.* (1997) and Sloane *et* al. (1999). This implies that the rate of return to education depends on the allocation of skills over jobs where workers found are not randomly distributed, instead there are based on the choices made to maximise their income.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper is an attempt to fill a lingering gap in the existing studies on overeducationby examining the incidence, determinants, and effects of overeducationin the context of a developing country such as Malaysia. We have at our disposal a unique workplace dataset that contains information on required education to do the job.

Using the workers' own self assessment, we find whilst the majority of workers in the manufacturing sector are in well-matched jobs, overeducation accounted for about 19% of the sample and nearly one-third of our sample is undereducated. We then explore the earnings outcomes of surplus, required and deficit schooling. The findings showed that the rate of return to education depends on the allocation of skills over jobs where earnings is not fully embodied but is (partly) determined by job characteristics and/or by the quality of the match between skills supplied by the worker and skills required by the job. Returns to required education is much greater than returns to actual educational attainment. Moreover, the ORU model clearly showed that although returns to surplus education were positive (S^o), the returns were lower than the returns to required education (S^r). This can be interpreted as the earnings loss for individuals for being ended in overeducated job.Therefore, there is no reason to expect that wage rates will be wholly related to acquired/actual schooling or other individual attributes as in human capital theory, neither should we expect that wage rates will be wholly related to the nature of the job as argued by job competition model.

However, this could not suggest that higher expenditure on education by our government in the last 5-10 years is a waste of resource due to the fact that there is still a positive and increasing returns on earnings from schooling that exceeded the requirement for the job occupied. To some extent, this would also imply that the surplus education is not the result of *potentially* decreasing. In addition, overeducated workers may bring positive spilloversat the workplace. If workers have accumulated more education than is optimal, it may positively influence co-workers wages where overeducated workers may share their skills and knowledge, to mutually raise co-workers' productivity and thereby raise wages.

Nevertheless, for policy implication, the phenomenon of over-education among highly educated workers in the Malaysian labour market may impede the country's intention to move towards the state of being a high-income country, as outlined in the "New Economic Model" blueprint as it reduces individuals' productivity.

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[12]Using a Wald test, these differences also are statistically significant different from zero across the men and women sample. These results are available upon request.

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TABLE 1: Means And Standard Deviation

| Variable	All		Male		Female	
	Mean	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**
Education level						
No/informal qualification	0.03	0.18	0.04	0.21	0.02	0.14
Primary education	0.12	0.33	0.13	0.33	0.12	0.33
Lower secondary	0.25	0.43	0.28	0.45	0.21	0.41
Upper secondary	0.38	0.49	0.36	0.49	0.41	0.49
Diploma	0.13	0.34	0.11	0.31	0.15	0.36
University	0.09	0.29	0.08	0.29	0.09	0.29
Most appropriate level of education for the work you are doing						
Degree	10.5		10.7		10.2	
Diploma	17.1		15.1		19.5	
Upper secondary	35.5		34.3		36.9	
Lower secondary	23.1		24.6		21.4	
Primary	8.2		8.4		8.0	
Informal/None	5.6		6.9		4.0	
Age	34.89	9.83	35.86	9.99	33.91	9.56
Years of schooling completed	11.31	3.52	11.02	3.63	11.64	3.34
Years of schooling required	10.73	2.21	10.61	2.26	10.88	2.15
Years of surplus schooling	2.58	1.08	2.60	1.13	2.54	1.02
Years of deficit schooling	2.60	1.09	2.60	1.10	2.61	1.09
Exp (month)	165.45	120.05	181.26	123.15	149.38	114.61
Train	0.42	0.49	0.43	0.50	0.40	0.49
Female	0.55	0.45				
Married	0.65	0.48	0.68	0.47	0.62	0.49
Ethnicity						
Malay	0.55	0.50	0.58	0.49	0.52	0.50
Chinese	0.35	0.48	0.33	0.47	0.39	0.49
Indian	0.10	0.29	0.09	0.29	0.10	0.30
Region						
Central	0.35	0.48	0.35	0.48	0.34	0.47
North	0.23	0.42	0.24	0.42	0.23	0.42
South	0.33	0.47	0.31	0.46	0.34	0.47
East coast	0.03	0.16	0.03	0.18	0.02	0.13
Malaysia East	0.07	0.25	0.07	0.25	0.07	0.25
Educational -mismatch						
Well-matched	51.9		48.7		55.7	
Overeducated	18.5		18.5		18.6	
Undereducated	29.6		32.8		25.7	
Hourly earnings						
Well-matched	12.09	30.73	13.77	26.48	10.56	34.10
Overeducated	9.79	18.44	10.19	14.54	9.42	21.48
Undereducated	12.17	19.74	13.91	23.21	9.93	13.73

FIGURE 1: The Incidence Of Educational Mismatch Across Level Of Educational Attainment

FIGURE 2: The Incidence Of Educational Mismatch By Industry

TABLE 2: The Wage Impacts Of Over-Education And Under-Education

lnwage (hourly)	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Yearsch	0.03699***		
	(0.00183)		
Required educ (S^r)		0.07040***	0.09873***
		(0.00293)	(0.00338)
Surplus edu (S^o)			0.05478***
			(0.00474)
Deficit edu (S^u)			-0.04480***
			(0.00461)
Exp	0.00122***	0.00119***	0.00136***
	(0.00015)	(0.00015)	(0.00015)
Expsqr100	-0.00017***	-0.00018***	-0.00018***
	(0.00003)	(0.00003)	(0.00003)
Training	0.09076***	0.06630***	0.06234***
	(0.01208)	(0.01197)	(0.01186)
Female	-0.26177***	-0.25256***	-0.25259***
	(0.01093)	(0.01086)	(0.01074)
Cons	2.97966***	2.57944***	2.22788***
	(0.05553)	(0.06139)	(0.06423)
N	9902	9903	9902
R-square	0.661	0.667	0.675
R-adjusted	0.659	0.665	0.673
Log-likelihood	-6771.71	-6680.42	-6558.00

Robust standard error in italics
*, **, and *** respectively 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01

TABLE 3: The Wage Impacts Of Over-Education And Under-Education By Gender

lnwage (hourly)	Male			Female		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Yearsch	0.04340***			0.03039***		
	(0.00287)			(0.00238)		
Required educ (S^r)		0.06836***	0.09298***		0.06771***	0.09962***
		(0.00410)	(0.00481)		(0.00424)	(0.00488)
Surplus edu (S^o)			0.04423***			0.06311***
			(0.00649)			(0.00705)
Deficit edu (S^u)			-0.03779***			-0.05424***
			(0.00589)			(0.00746)
Exp	0.00095***	0.00153***	0.00160***	0.00146***	0.00079***	0.00109***
	(0.00023)	(0.00020)	(0.00019)	(0.00020)	(0.00024)	(0.00023)
Expsqr100	-0.00012**	-0.00024***	-0.00022***	-0.00021***	-0.00012**	-0.00015***
	(0.00005)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00005)	(0.00005)
Training	0.10168***	0.04982***	0.04526***	0.07562***	0.08443***	0.08045***
	(0.01675)	(0.01720)	(0.01711)	(0.01739)	(0.01674)	(0.01655)
Cons	2.67399***	2.63955***	2.32951***	3.10203***	2.39368***	2.00445***
	(0.07719)	(0.08675)	(0.09173)	(0.07937)	(0.08609)	(0.08964)
N	4547	5355	5355	5355	4548	4547
R-square	0.673	0.667	0.673	0.659	0.674	0.685
R-adjusted	0.669	0.664	0.670	0.655	0.670	0.681
Log-likelihood	-2883.30	-3693.97	-3649.17	-3763.41	-2878.92	-2799.10

Robust standard error in italics
*, **, and *** respectively 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01

TABLE 4:Summary Of The Wage Impacts Of Surplus And Deficit Education

lnwage (hourly)	Pooled	Male	Female
Model 1			
Year of schooling completed (S^a)	0.03699***	0.04340***	0.03039***
	(0.00183)	(0.00287)	(0.00238)
N	9,902	5,355	4,547
R-adjusted	0.659	0.669	0.655
Model 2			
Required education (S^r)	0.07040***	0.06836***	0.06771***
	(0.00293)	(0.00410)	(0.00424)
N	9902	5,355	4,547
R-adjusted	0.66500	0.664	0.670
Model 3			
Required education (S^r)	0.09873***	0.09298***	0.09962***
	(0.00338)	(0.00481)	(0.00488)
Surplus education (S^o)	0.05478***	0.04423***	0.06311***
	(0.00474)	(0.00649)	(0.00705)
Deficit education (S^u)	-0.04480***	-0.03779***	-0.05424***
	(0.00461)	(0.00589)	(0.00746)
N	9,902	5,355	4,547
R-adjusted	0.673	0.670	0.681

Robust standard error in italics
Other covariates – work experience, training, female, marital status, children under 12 years old,
ethnic, occupations, hours of work, tenure, industry, firm size, ownership and firm age
*, **, and *** respectively 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01

TABLE5:F-Statistics OfEquation (3) Against The Alternatives

	Total	Males	Females
Human capital theory			
$H_1: \gamma_1 = \gamma_2 = -\gamma_3$	118.38***	72.60***	68.01***
Job competition model			
$H_2: \gamma_2 = \gamma_3 = 0$	119.50***	46.76***	26.31***

***   *Significant at 0.01*
Note γ_1, γ_2 and γ_3 *denote required, over and under schooling, respectively*