The Announcement of *Dar al-Harb* in Cyber Media in Context of the Theological Policy of Jihad: Reading the Cyber-Jihad and ISIS based on the *Pharmakon* Characteristic of the Cyber Media

BURCU KAYA ERDEM* & REMZİ BİLGE[1]

ABSTRACT

'Pharmakon' is a dualist word which means remedy or poison, or neither remedy nor poison, and it was used by Jacques Derrida in the Pharmacy of Plato (La Pharmacie de Platon - 1972) where he made a structural analysis of Plato's dialog with Phaedrus. Some think that it is a remedy; it is beneficial, and it produces and mends. Others think that it is a poison, because it makes you forget, makes you become distant to the truth, and isolates you from reality. This is similar to the character of cyber media, which is considered as both a remedy and a poison, indicating a widely-accepted dilemma between its purposes and conditions when it was first created and the form of usage today. This is related to the fact that cyber media is being discussed once again after the announcement of cyber-jihad by ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), since some believe that radical Islam is a remedy, and others believe that it makes you become distant to the truth and turns a defensive tool into an antagonistic weapon.

Keywords: cyber jihad, cyber media, Dar al-Harb, ISIS, pharmakon

Before understanding and making sense of the *pharmakon* character of cyber media as well as the phenomenon of jihad, we would like to begin by describing the technology of the Internet, which is an important phenomenon in the development of the Western world in terms of communication sociology. This is because the West created a curious development in its quest for growth and founded and improved ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network), which is the premise of the Internet. This network became more popular and widespread and also became the topic of democratic public spaces. In fact, it was intended to be a "defense project". There was no way for the West to know that this new defense project would be used by *mujahids* when they were creating it. Yet, there was a production similar to the chimeric living things which carry multiple DNA profiles in the same body together. The Internet is a tool which is almost impossible to supervise and determine who, how, and for what purposes it will be used. The most controversial example of this is the announcement of jihad against the Western world by the radical Islamic terrorist organization ISIS.

The Internet came into existence as a defense project funded by the West, and it has been used by some radical (Eastern) Islamic organizations for a very long time. However, ISIS is the first organization that followed an Internet policy including having their *mujahids* develop software programs to increase the number of tweets they send; that is, they transformed this tool of defense into an attacking tool which is as competent and sufficient as it was intended to be. They see the Internet as a battlefield where the disbelievers can fight against them (e.g. do their propaganda and make an anti-Islam lifestyle attractive through movies and websites), and

as an area of *Dar al-Harb* (House of War) which should become *Dar al-Islam* (House of Islam). ISIS have discovered an area in cyber media where they can fight with the state authorities and even the "big Western evil allies" they oppose to in the world as an Islamic organization and as equals practically without leaving their geography for the first time in history.

The Roots of the Cyber Media: "The Internet: From a Defense Project to an Antagonistic Weapon"

There are two fundamental approaches to the intentions and circumstances of the creation of the Internet. These approaches both deny each other and bring us closer to the dualist character of the Internet. The first approach indicates that the ARPANET, which is the premise of the Internet, was started as a defense project against nuclear attacks when the intercontinental ballistic missiles were developed. The second approach, which was claimed by the multiple writers of the article "A Brief History of the Internet", is that the ARPANET was not designed to resist to a nuclear attack. Accordingly, the main intention of the ARPANET was to solve the problems related to the loss of capacity created by the geographic disconnection between the researchers in the country. In other words, it is completely addressed to the civil targets of civil researchers.

What and who these researchers were that were struggling with these crucial disconnections and losses is also controversial, because the efforts to prevent the crucial disconnections and losses can also be seen as defensive and/or protective. The purposes and circumstances of the development of the Internet have been discussed. Another discussion emphasizes the dualist character of the Internet and its relation to freedom of expression, participation, and equality, which are the core qualities of democracy.

The arguments that the Internet, in contrast with other types of media, eliminated the inequalities between gender and age groups, classes of income, urban and rural areas, developed and under-developed parts of cities, and the inequalities between cities, regions, countries, and continents thanks to the equal access facility it provides has created a debate in communication and sociology that brought technological determinists to the concept of a "global village".

However, what is equal is not always necessarily fair and/or legitimate. In this post-modern world, the argument of "providing equality" through the Internet, as almost all phenomena, leads the way to other discussions because of its dualist character. The Internet is the dominant arena of "relatively equal" struggles or fights not only with its access to important news and goods by anyone anytime from anywhere in the world, but also with its character which is very hard to control. In this context, it is not odd that the defense weapon of subject A turns into an attacking weapon for subject B.

The Chance to Make an "Equal" Struggle with the *Pharmakon* Character of Cyber Media

In the sense which we are familiar with from the reading of Derrida, it is undecided whether *pharmakon* is both remedy and poison, and/or neither remedy nor poison. In other words, *pharmakon* does not have a consistent core; it is just a position which brings together certain oppositions and makes the meaning or subject continuously inconsistent: writing and speaking, remembering and forgetting, remedy and poison.

According to Derrida: "The common translation of *pharmakon* by remedy [remide}-a beneficent drug-is not, of course, inaccurate. Not only can *pharmakon* really mean remedy and thus erase, on a certain surface of its functioning, the ambiguity of its meaning. But it is even quite obvious here, the stated intention of Theuth being precisely to stress the worth of his product, that he turns the word on its strange and invisible pivot, presenting it from a single one, the most reassuring, of its poles. TlVs medicine is beneficial; it repairs and produces, accumulates and remedies, increases knowledge and reduces forgetfulness. Its translation by "remedy" nonetheless erases, in going outside the Greek language, the other pole reserved in the

word *pharmakon.* It cancels out the resources of ambiguity and makes more difficult, if not impossible, an understanding of the context. As opposed to "drug" or even "medicine," remedy says the transparent rationality of science, technique, and therapeutic causality, thus excluding from the text any leaning toward the magic virtues of a force whose effects are hard to master, a dynamics that constantly surprises the one who tries to manipulate it as master and as subject" (Derrida 1981: 97).

Derrida makes it possible that *pharmakon* is describable on the contrast between writing and speaking (word). According to Derrida, the contrast between "speaking and writing" or "informal language-formal (written) language" dates back to Plato's idealism, and its footprints can be followed through the history of philosophy. According to Plato, writing has a completely worthless position compared to speaking. The philosophy of Plato is a hierarchy of philosophies due to its essentialist structure. The dichotomies including writing-speaking, what is seen-what is thought, doxa-episteme, hystoria-theoria, material-spirit, and changing-existing form the milestones of Plato's philosophy with a hierarchy that is created to the advantage of those who are second. The point where Derrida determined a problem and considered as the starting point of his work is that Plato almost completely destroyed the value of writing against speaking from Soktate's mouth in *Phaedrus* with the support of a variety of myths (Özden 2015: 4).

Derrida sampled the mythic dialog between god Theuth and King Thamus in Plato's Phaedrus, followed the prints of *pharmakon* in the complete works of Plato based on the remedy and/or posion characteristic of writing, and decoded Plato's texts deconstructing themselves, emphasizing the remedy quality of the concept.

King Theuth want to give a 'gift' to King Thamus. This gift is writing, Theuth presents this writing as a prescription and a remedy (pharmakon) that is good for memory. However, the king refuses this gift, saying that it would cause forgetfulness; writing is a solution for remembering rather than memory. According to the Thamus, writing is a poison (pharmakon), while Theuth showed it as a remedy. For sure, Derrida passes beyond the hesitant meaning of *pharmakon* and decodes the paradox in it as well as the character of "neither . . . nor" or "both . . . and".

As Richard Harland nares: This is meaning in a state of paradox, meaning oscillating perpetually between poles, impossible to pin down as any kind of fixed entity or substance. For Derrida, the *pharmakon* is the "medium in which differentiation in general is produced". It is the common element shared by the different signifies of the signifier *pharmakon.* It is that which renders the "remedy", the "poison", or the "philtre" a *pharmakon*. It is the point of convergence of all these different senses of the word. It is the medium through which they are all defined as *pharmakon*. The *pharmakon* is their common topos prior to their division into different or opposite possibilities. It is the point of departure for its different meanings. At their point of intersection, the different or even opposite senses of the Word remain inextricably linked. All of them are *pharmakon* (Kakoliris 2013: 226).

Derrida does not deny the intensity of the opposition however he's inrerested in mediating between poles apart that bringing them closer together. This is the paradoxical character that "it" has in its body from the beginning yet everyone failed to see, could not see, and/or refused to see. Radical Islam aims the defensive weapon of the West back toward them and transforms it into an antagonistic attacking weapon, using cyber media (the Internet) technology for it, which is the sharpest example for *pharmakon*. In this example, the most important phenomenon that goes beyond the readings of *pharmakon* is equality.

According to Lawrence Venuti in his book Scandals of Translation, "Translation can never simply be communication between equals because it is fundamentally ethnocentric". (Venuti 1998: 11). Thus, it is possible to claim that no subject related to communication includes pure equality (an encounter of absolute equals). However, it should be unavoidably accepted that cyber media is the technology which brought different cultures to the closest point to equality in the last few centuries.

As is widely acknowledged, the last big break of Islam related to the West is the fall of Granada, Andalucia, in 1492. It not widely accepted that the Islamic East has had equal circumstances and ground with the West since this date. Then, which aspects make it possible for cyber media to help Islamic organizations reach equal conditions for fighting? Cyber media can raise even its simplest claim for power regarding time to the status of "seeing/interfering without being seen", which is the highest stage of a victorious struggle for power. Cyber-jihad has become for the first time the fight of two equal and unseen powers behind their already-established rules, instead of the sides of an unequal battle of the previously known jihad. In this context, the aim of this study was to read cyber media as a type of media which has the power to transform the clash of civilizations, that is unequal and has been going on for hundreds of years, into a competition between equals. Thus, the researcher aims to take another step toward breaking the unbreakable chain of insufficiency and desperation to read the relation between the historical, cultural, and philosophical roots of the Eastern civilization and the 'modern' acts and practices.

The study will also attempt to make it more understandable in sociological and communicative terms that the *salafi* organizations gladly use the Western-made cyber media for jihad while they want to live in the Age of Bliss and follow the 'archaic' traditions in all their living practices.

The Theology and Politics of Jihad from Sa'd to Allah

The Islam prophet's experience during his contemplations in a cave in Mount Hira resulted in events that affected not only the destiny of the broken tribes living in the southern belt of the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century, but also the times that are beyond its era, including the global system of today. It is necessary to examine the sociological profile of Mecca in the pre- and post-Islamic periods to comprehend the causes of these events, make a connection between belief and politics, and analyze the political mission of jihad in this context.

Although the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century AD was the home for the believers of divine religions such as Judaism and Christianity as well as followers of old tenets such as Sabians, the main structure of the region mainly consisted of Arabian tribes who hated each other. Blood feuds that last for many years, endless conflicts that trigger each other on strategic points such as wells and lands of date palms and to the sharing of religious centers, and the destructive effect of the desert which prevents any kind of unity led Arabian tribes to be divided most of the time yet sometimes endure small collaborations when their end goals were similar, however weak they were, which led to nothing but the emergence of greater wars.

We do not have indisputable historic data; still, it is a common opinion that the power keeping the Arabian society together was their belief in the holiness of Kaaba. However, neither the stone walls of Kaaba nor the idols in it, of which there were more than 300, had a great meaning, because the idolist Arabs of that time had many idols in all parts of the peninsula, and "they would even make a mound of soil when they could not find any stones, brought a sheep, milked it on the mound, and circumambulated around it" (Çelikkol 2014: 164).

Yet the idolists easily left their beliefs sometimes, criticized their idols, and stopped worshiping them. In *Kitab al-Asnam* (The Book of Idols), which is the biggest work in this field, Ibn Al-Kalbi says that a tribe member who approached the idol of the Malik and Milkan tribes at the coast of Jeddah was scared of the blood that was poured on the idols as a tradition, made the camels run away, and threw a stone at the idol, cursing it. The poem told by the camel owner is very important: "We have come to Sa'd to be united. But Sa'd tore us apart" (Ibn Al-Kalbi 1968: 41). This shows that the Arabs believed in the idols at a questionable level; they actually saw them as a tool for unity.

This explains the importance of Kaaba in Mecca. Although it is controversial, the Yemen-origined Curhum tribe had a big influence on the establishment of the administration of Mecca, which changed hands a few times and became the topic of different conflicts and agreements.

The members of the Curhum tribe won the rule of the city of Mecca and helped this city to a new organization in many dimensions.

> The Yemen-origined Curhum tribe in Mecca had a leader to whom they were committed. It was a tradition for Yemen tribes to not make any movements without their leader. They had a different order of living, and Mecca had a suitable environment for them to show their administrative skills, both of which led to the birth of a new administrative approach in Mecca. They also had the experience of living a settled life, and this may show that they created a civilization in Mecca which had a different face (Çelikkol 2014: 205).

It was an advantage for the tribes that administered the city in later years that Mecca was systematized and administered with a new approach of management. Different idols were collected in Mecca over time, and large annual fairs were organized with the participation of many Arabian tribes as well as the members of different beliefs in this region. These fairs were important since Mecca was right in the middle of the peninsula and near the sea—and it had a tradition of systematic administration; the idolists who came to Mecca during the Forbidden (Haram) Months, which were accepted by the Arabs, were able to circumambulate the Kaaba and visit the fairs in ceasefire. This made Mecca a safe place in time and also made it a "harem", increasing its importance compared to the other religious places in the peninsula. "The roots of the trade performed by the Quraysh tribe, were in the holiness of the Kaaba" (Çelikkol 2014: 53).

This shows that the pre-Islamic Arabian belief was the only factor that made the society stand in both economic and social terms, although it was slippery and permeable. The Arabian tribes who were looking for a chance to destroy each other created a value based on Kaaba, gathered around it, and established the foundation of living together through different agreements.

In this chaotic environment, the residents of Mecca, specifically those who have a low income level, felt drawn to accept the conveyance, and grouped around the Islam prophet, over a long period of time. The idolists of Mecca were suspicious of this new constitution due to economic (not religious) reasons, and they began to torture others, especially the slaves who were not defended by anyone.

> The people who gathered around Muhammad were seen to be dangerous from the moment they were seen as an organized power, and they became a target, because the spreading of the new religion (claim) means the deterioration of the ruling religion, ideology, and relationships of interest. Before long, they used all methods of pressure and prevention including physical force" (Güler 2010: 48).

In the first stage, the verses given to Muhammed were mostly about the metaphysical world and addressed to create a divine awakening. The new belief, of which the framework was gradually clarified with these verses, made the idolists worried about the breaking of the balances which seemed to be "on thin ice" anyway. The tone of Al-Quran began to change in accordance with the increase in cruelty and boycotts, and the disintegration was accelerated. Fazlur Rahman said:

> As this struggle was ongoing, the new approach to belief brought by Muhammad, that is, the closed attitude of metaphysics or the basic belief, had a sharper expression using a strategy of discussion as the tasks assigned to both sides became clearer to themselves and to their opposition. Considering the historic chronology, monotheism is related to the first belief placed into the minds of people—the day of judgment, or doomsday. Human beings are not only rebels

but they are also hard-boiled disobedients. Thus, there should be a settlement which requires giving big rewards to those who are right and good and horrible punishments to disbelievers and mean ones (Rahman 2014: 58).

The horrible punishments of this first settlement, which were mentioned in the verses, were not limited to the afterlife; Hegira to the city of Medina was the beginning of the end of the inoffensive period in Mecca, and Islam started to respond to its enemies with its own struggling style.

Thus, when Muhammad, who was actually opposed to the political order that lost its balance with his opposition to the religious structure in Mecca, rejected the idols, he not only became a side of a theological dispute, but he also damaged the foundation that all political systems of Arabs stood on and provided the legitimacy of the administration. Although the existence of the idols in Kaaba and around it was not very important for the Henotheist Arabs, their own existence in the case of the idols' non-existence was crucial. For this reason, the idols were the knots that tied together the current pre-Islamic system, which would not make sense without them. The "Muhammadian message" shook this system which could barely stand, and it began to change social, religious, and economic life.

In the Arabian Peninsula, where the only political and social unit was a tribe, most of the Arabs were polytheists. When Muhammad claimed a new religious fact saying that he was given revelations by Allah, and in time gained people on his side, this development created a rip-off in the traditional, social, economic, political, and religious structure (Güler 2010: 47).

The Muslims were under pressure as a result of this rip-off, and they migrated to the city of Medina, following their prophet. The Muslims founded a city-state in Medina, gave certain rights to the Jews, and reinforced their power with an agreement. However, the migration from Mecca was so sudden that the Muslims, who were referred to as *muhajirs* (immigrants), found themselves in an economically difficult situation. Thinking that their houses in Mecca were plundered, the immigrants attacked the camel train of Mecca that passed through Badr and confiscated all of the goods on the camel train. Although based on different results this time, this event found its own place in Islamic law later on, since it was justified with the verse *"And Allah has already made you victorious at Badr, when you were a weak little force. So fear Allah much that you may be grateful"* (al-Quran 3: 123), and became the foundation of the method of "justified plunder" in jihad, which is still being used by different organizations today. In contrast with the Mecca period when battles were not allowed, all verses related to jihad were included in the Al-Quran in the Medina period. In this context, jihad, which is described as "to work, struggle, use power and effort, use all possibilities on hand to achieve a certain task" (Cevherî 1998: 460 cited by Orhan 2014: 97) in dictionaries, was associated with the meaning of using power in a concrete way in the time of the prophet.

Al-Quran, which was conveyed by the Islam prophet explaining his own mission saying "I am a peace prophet; I am a war prophet" (Ibn Hanbel, *Al-Musned*: IV. 395, 404, 407; V. 405 cited by Yaman 1992: 123), declares with its verses revealed over a large period of time that war is a binding religious duty (fardh) for Muslims even if they do not like it (al-Quran, 2:216), those who run for jihad hope for the mercy and grace of Allah (al-Quran, 2:218), the Muslims who do not participate in jihad even though they do not have an excuse are not equal in the eyes of Allah with those who do participate (al-Quran, 4:95), and Muslims will be put through a bitter torment if they do not attend battle collectively (al-Quran, 9: 39). The Al-Quran orders Islam prophet Mohammad to fight against the infidels and hypocrites and to be harsh to them (al-Quran, 66:9), and Al-Quran also asks him to "encourage the Muslims toward jihad" (al-Quran, 8:65). The clearest goal of jihad is given in the 39th verse of Surah al-Anfal (Spoils of War) and in the *Surah al-Taubah* which begins with "an ultimatum to the polytheists from Allah and his messenger":

And fight them until there is no more Fitnah (disbelief and polytheism, i.e. worshiping others besides Allah) and the religion (worship) will all be for Allah alone (in the whole of the World). But if they cease (worshiping others besides Allah), then certainly, Allah is All-Seer of what they do (al-Quran 8:39)

Fight against those who believe not in Allah, nor in the Last Day, nor forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger (Muhammad) and those who acknowledge not the religion of truth (i.e. Islam) among the people of the scripture (Jews and Christians), until they pay the *jizyah* with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued (al-Quran 9:29)

As shown by these verses, al-Quran orders the believers to fight until the only religion in the world is Islam and struggle for this goal. In the present day, this claim is the main goal that is being followed by many Islamic organizations. The most important detail that should be remembered is that the text of al-Quran was open to the revelation of new verses while the Islam prophet was still alive, and this makes it possible for us to evaluate the text as a practical projection of the historical experience of the prophet himself. Such an analysis will show that the battle policy of Islam tries to control and "Islamize" all sectors, in fact, as a political movement based on religion. Thus, a battle is not fought just for religion or to change a religion. Due to al-Quran's approach that was shaped in the Mecca period, every touch related to religion is actually related to the political structure of the relevant society. For instance, according to al-Quran, when Moses conveyed Islam to the pharaoh, Fir'aun (Pharaoh) said: "Leave me to kill Musa (Moses), and let him call his Lord (to stop me from killing him)! I fear that he may change your religion, or that he may cause mischief to appear in the land!" (al-Quran 40:26). On the other hand, al-Quran says that Moses asked the pharaoh to release the Hebrew people he had enslaved rather than asking him to change the Egyptian people's religion (al-Quran 7:105). This shows that it is a political decision, according to the al-Quran, but it is actually a religious decision. In the al-Quran, the pharaoh's objection to Moses shows that he regarded a social change in his community as an attempt to change the community's religion. For exactly this reason, Surah al-Kafirun (The Unbelievers), which is the famous slogan of al-Quran against the idolists, is actually the manifesto of a big political uprising; "Say: (O Muhammad to these Mushrikun and Kafirun): "O al-Kafirun (disbelievers in Allah, in His Oneness, in His Angels, in His Books, in His Messengers, in the Day of Resurrection, and in al-Qadar.)! "I worship not that which you worship, nor will you worship that which I worship and I shall not worship that which you are worshiping. Nor will you worship that which I worship. To you be your religion, and to me my religion (Islamic Monotheism) (al-Quran, 109: 1-6). It is not only the religious codes that are changed in this surah; the current structure of the community is changed with all of its dimensions including economic, social, and political sides.

The Meccans who fought for the sharing of one single service related to the Kaaba surely understood the political results of such a separation, and Islam turned out to be an uprising against the current order exactly for this reason. When al-Quran's struggle with the polytheists is evaluated considering this historical background, the causality of the actions of the Muslim groups, who aim for the modern political systems even though they do not worship idols today, can be explained. This means that it was not possible for Islam to develop an approach to religion that was independent from politics and clear the struggle for this religion from using force, since it replaced the religious approach that supported the political system before itself in the first place.

In his article titled *'The Uprising Law in Islam*', Rahman (2015: 129) said ". . . Islam itself was an uprising against the settled situation (status quo) in Arabia in the seventh century. This uprising emerged in Mecca and Medina and spread through all of the Arabian Peninsula and beyond", which is a short sentence that demonstrates the character of Islam as well as revealing

a historical fact. "The law of Islam covers the entire social and religious lives of societies"; it does not cover only the religious life (Makdisi 1997; 116).

Jihad, just like the ideological tools of pressure used by states, tries to handle life with all its dimensions including social, political, religious, and economic ones in Islam, in which religion and politics do not mix but come to life directly in each other. Thus, every new fact and area is a candidate target or tool for jihad due to the verse ". . . make ready against them all you can of power. . ." (al-Quran 8:60).

Location-based War Policy of Islam and Cyber Jihad

Islam divides the earth into two parts that are completely in contrast with each other: *Dar al-Islam (House of Islam)* and *Dar al-Harb (House of War)*. In Arabic, "*dar*" means "house, district, or a place where a tribe accommodates or settles" (Özel 2012: 43). *Dar al-Islam* is an Islamic expression which means the place where Muslims have conquered and been ruling, while *Dar al-Harb* means the war country which is not under the rule of Islam. This shows that Islamic belief requires the world to make a choice between Islam and war— and live with the results of this decision.

When determining the *dar* which a country, that is, a geographical place with identified political borders, is included in, Islam asks the power that rules that country. A country's identification as *Dar al-Harb* or *Dar al-Islam* is not altered by its entire population being Muslim or non-Muslim. The important point is that this region is assigned an administrator, and the provisions of Islam begin to be executed (Özel 2012: 44-45).

Therefore, the region must be bound to the rule of the caliph. This means that Turkish Republic is also *Dar al-Harb* according to many Islamic terror organizations despite the fact that a majority of its population are believers of Sunni Islam. For this reason, *mujahid*s only follow a *fardh* when they fight with Turkey, damage the Turkish army, or create an environment of fear and worry, because the books of Islamic law (fiqh) describe *Dar al-Islam* as "the country where the rule and authority of the imam of Muslims (the president) are in power" (Özel 2012: 43-44).

Due to the verses in al-Quran such as "who is better in judgement than Allah for a people who have firm Faith" (5:50), all regions where laws are not based on *shariah* and the prohibitions of sheria are not performed have a polytheist order (şirk), which means accepting an entity that is equal to God. This is who *Dar al-Harb* is also called *Dar al-Şirk*. This is an area where Islam, meaning 'peace' in Arabic language, wants to have sovereignty.

It is a huge innovation in the history of religions that the world is divided into two with a theological dispute, and this dispute was politicized through jihad. This innovation accelerated the spreading of Islam and even became the main dynamic of this spreading.

> "Jihad can be seen as the main prerequisite which prevents the revelations to Muhammad from remaining as just historical and theological foot notes. Qutb (et al.) described jihad as a miracle of Islam, since they thought it was responsible for such a rapid transformation of a tribal community in such a short timeframe. Although the revelations were valid, they would not last long without jihad, at least not with their current forms. Jihad was the factor that determined the advancement of Islam; its current role is to ensure the spreading and/or survival of Islam either for the small or the great jihad." (Bunt 2007: 49).

And Islam actually managed to get beyond its own geography in a very short time thanks to jihad. The Arabian tribes who were continually fighting to destroy each other could only be stopped for a limited period of time in the pre-Islamic era with a practice called Forbidden Months to worship idols and circumambulate the Kaaba. Islam turned this potential into fighting as a worshiping practice and provided benefit from it. In the era of the first caliphs (Rashidun Caliphate) who came to rule right after the death of the Islam prophet, the entire Arabian

Peninsula as well as Syria, Egypt and Iran were conquered only 50 years after the first revelation. The Islam religion spread through Tripoli in the northern coast of Africa and through Khorasan and Merv in eastern Iran. This big wave was followed by Umayyad Caliphate, who had the entire Northern Africa, and conquered Spain. These were the times when the equal competition between the East and the West was still continuing, and jihad was the topic of a balanced battle.

However, the completion of Reconquista (Spanish: conquer) in 1492, that is, the end of the 800-year Muslim rule in Andalusia thanks to the battle strategies of Ferdinand II of Aragon, was not only a hand-change of a geography, but it was also the change of the balance in history regarding Islam. Although Constantinopolis, another important city in the east of Spain, was conquered by Muslims in 1453, the power of Islam which spread around the world rapidly was completely broken in the following few centuries; Ottoman Empire, the biggest Islamic State in the world, entered World War I in a shrinking state and was entirely divided into pieces after it, and it was removed from history, leaving a chaos that was similar to the struggle between the pre-Islamic tribes.

Subsequently, there were Islamic struggles that mostly turned into national battles against the new states who had begun to rule the old Islamic lands, and there was no large-scale collaboration among Muslims since the caliphate was abolished by the Turkish Republic. However, the development of the Western world led to a curious event, and the United States Defense Department established and improved Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), which was the preliminary foundation of the Internet. This network became widespread and strong, and it started to serve mankind with its democratization. This new platform was determined as a place that attracted people's attention and made their own reality stronger. Thus, it entered the *fiqh* area of Islam, and it became a part of location-based war politics. Today, the *mujahids* believe that the Internet is a battlefield where the 'infidels' can fight against them (e.g. create propaganda and attract people to an anti-Islamic lifestyle through movies and websites), and they accept it as a *Dar al-Harb* that should be turned into *Dar al-Islam.*

> Now, jihad has gained an electronic dimension by jointing to cyber space, and in
> some cases, a digital sword is used to fight in the name of jihad (Bunt 2007: 47)

The *Dar al-Harb* Declaration of the Caliph and the Cyber-repercussions of Terror

Although it regards itself as the only legitimate Islamic State, today ISIS is one of the most well-known Islamic terror organizations. Familiarity of this organization is based on their violent and cruel actions, which they do not hesitate to disclose to the whole world and the fact that they actively use the internet to announce these actions by transforming them into a demonstration or, in their own statements, to give notification. On social media channels, ideological messages supported with verses and professionally edited massacre videos, adorned with effects approximating Hollywood movies have circulated rapidly. Even though previous organizations, especially al-Qaida, used the internet for their own ideological purposes, internet use to this extent to legitimate violence and the amount of interest that they have drawn have been never seen before. This situation is absolutely a foreseeable consequence of the *pharmakon* characteristic of the media and unpreventable noticeability of evil. As noted by Dr. Liang, terror is transmitted to the whole world in real time.

> Today, IS has brought cyber jihad to a whole new level, evolving from static
> websites, chat forums, and online magazines to making efficient use of today's
> interactive and fast-paced social media platforms. While Al Qaeda and its
> affiliates see the Internet as a place to disseminate information and meet
> anonymously, IS followers are loud and noisy, tweeting, streaming and

Instagramming their exploits. Terror is now being transmitted across the globe in real time (Liang 2015: 2).

In this context, an online magazine named *Dabiq,* which was published by ISIS in Ramadan of 1435 according to the Islamic Hijri calendar, caused surprise in both secularized Islamic environments and extremist Muslim groups who show a tendency to becoming militant. The magazine was published in English as propaganda for the organization or, in their statements, the Islamic State to the whole world has many characteristics that leave behind all propaganda activities of the Islamic-themed organizations until the publication date of the magazine. This magazine was initiated with the decision of Al-Hayat, the media center of the organization, and here is the aim and style of the publication as expressed by the editorial board of the magazine:

> After a review of some of the comments received on the first issues of Islamic State News and Islamic State Report, Al-Hayat Media Center decided to carry on the effort insha' Allah – into a periodical magazine focusing on issues of *tawhid, manhaj, hijrah, jihad*, and *jama'ah*. It will also contain photo reports, current events, and informative articles on matters related to the Islamic State. May Allah bless this effort and make it a beacon for generations to come (*Dabiq* 1435 A.H. 1: 3-4).

However, the name of the magazine, *Dabiq,* has a quite important eschatological meaning in Islamic theology. Although Dabiq is a small town in northern Syria, according to the common belief of Muslims, it is the place where the Islamic Armageddon will occur. This belief based on a hadith about the fact that *Rûms*, meaning Romans in Arabic, will come to Dabiq and a Muslim army will appear in front of them. It teaches that the Islamic eschatology will only be fulfilled after this great war.

> The Hour will not be established until the Romans land at al-A'maq or Dabiq (two places near each other in the northern countryside of Halab). Then an army from al-Madinah of the best people on the earth at that time will leave for them. When they line up in ranks, the Romans will say, 'Leave us and those who were taken as prisoners from amongst us so we can fight them.' The Muslims will say, 'Nay, by Allah, we will not abandon our brothers to you.' So they will fight them. Then one third of them will flee; Allah will never forgive them. One third will be killed; they will be the best martyrs with Allah. And one third will conquer them; they will never be afflicted with fitna. Then they will conquer Constantinople. While they are dividing the war booty, having hung their swords on olive trees, Shaytan will shout, 'The [false] Messiah has followed after your families [who were left behind.]' So they will leave [for their families], but Shaytan's claim is false. When they arrive to Sham he comes out. Then while they are preparing for battle and filing their ranks, the prayer is called. So 'Isa Ibn Maryam ('alayhis-Salam) will descend and lead them. When the enemy of Allah sees him, he will melt as salt melts in water. If he were to leave him, he would melt until he perished, but he kills him with his own hand, and then shows them his blood upon his spear (*Dabiq* 1435 A.H. 1: 4-5).

This organization gains strength from such a strong eschatology. Jesus Christ, the great war, and the devil are mentioned together and interlocked around a central character, the caliph, arising in history. It repeated this in its all media organs to strengthen its movement. In this sense, *Dabiq* not only pursues an organizational propaganda goal, it also performs an eschatological religious task because the Armageddon in Dabiq will be a war between good and

evil, the believer and the disbeliever. The fact that the organization has named the magazine that is used to represent this organization in the world *Dabiq* indicates that the caliph considered himself a representative, not of any Islamic case, but of its main struggle that can be written with capital letters and articles. This is because, according to the modern Salafi perception, the concept of *Rûm* does not only refer to Romans, it refers the entire West due to the structure of its religious beliefs, which makes all of its people disbelievers.

The first issue *Dabiq* was entitled "The Return of Khilafah." It announced a new period for Muslims and that the world was divided into two camps. This remarkable title influenced both the secularized Muslims who excluded the Khilafah issue from the universe of discussion about a hundred years ago and Islamic organizations. Since this claim was summarized by the title of the first issue of the magazine it showed that the organization leader undertook both a secular and spiritual mission and put himself and his organization over other Islamic organizations. Thus, many Islamic organizations have made various claims for the last thirty years, while there are very few groups that so strongly present the claim of being a representative of a global khilafah. This was expressed in a paragraph entitled "The World has been divided into two camps":

> Amirul-Mu'minin said: "O Ummah of Islam, indeed the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy – the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the Jews (*Dabiq* 1435 A.H. 1: 10).

The Caliph acting in the capacity of *Amirul-Mu'minin*, speaking with the authority of a supra-temporal religious power has reported that he divided the world into two camps: The camp of Islam and the camp of *kufr* (disbelief). The statement of the Caliph that includes the ability to be the 'creator of a new world' was published in an online magazine that is professionally designed and supported with remarkable images. This showed that this division also includes cyber-society. This has authorized web sites and social media for notification and also legitimated cyber-attacks against web sites regarded as being in the camp of *kufr* and even against various critical institutions and the bank accounts of dissenting governments.

The Islamic Statement has a military doctrine foreseeing the division of all real or virtual channels into two and has carried out its cyber jihad activities via social media including Facebook and Twitter as well as magazines such as *Dabiq*, *Konstantiniyye* and *Rumiyah*. They have fulfilled the tasks they believe God has assigned to them with a virtual sword. However, other channels aside, *Dabiq* is the most important propaganda organ of the organization with its pages supported by images that are professionally edited and its notable cover photos. In the magazine, the stories of *mujahids* who were martyred during terrorist actions in the USA and Europe are discussed as acts of great heroism. This magazine shares information such as how targeted people can be killed or how more powerful terrorist actions can be organized. In the 'Selected 10' section of every issue, there is a summary of ten videos chosen from the provinces of the Islamic State with a photograph. The videos definitely include at least one execution image and a propaganda video pointing to the social or political power of the Islamic State. In this reality created by the online magazine, the fact that a captive tied to the ground who waits to be exploded is shared with the title of "Crushing the enemy," or that child soldiers are praised with the title of "The path of righteous fathers" (*Dabiq* 1437 A.H. 15:77) has completed the abdication of reason of the generation that identified the 'virtual world' of the internet with its unreal code.

The social media network of the Islamic State pays more attention to expanding cyber-world to *mujahids* than other Islamic organizations. It is administered by a media section named *al-Furqan.* The media section of the Islamic World shares links to articles and videos published

on web sites and attempts to make itself known to larger masses of populations. The Arabic meaning of *al-Furqan* is "separating right and wrong from each other." This shows that the Islamic State is also informed about the *pharmakon* characteristic of the media. The organization reverses the West-centered news flow by forming its own media ethics and discloses savagery under the trueness part of the *al-Furqan* division by blessing it with Islamic jihad.

However, the Islamic State also uses the internet to provide training for organization sympathizers described as lone wolves and not directly affiliated with the Islamic State. For example, the magazine *Kybernetiq*, which was published by the organization in German in December, 2015 was planned to provide attack education to cyber-jihadists in Germany. Here is how a writer for the magazine, *iMujahid*, explains the importance of the internet for jihad:

> . . . It is very important to us that our brothers and sisters learn the proper handling of software and hardware. Once the West's technological and scientific progress was banished as the devil's work... we tended to demonize the work of the infidels . . . It is time to learn about its enormous importance of technology and learn how to apply it correctly (Scott & Spaniel 2016: 18-19).

This means that the West's technology is considered to have been mixed with the Devil's work and thus appears to the *mujahid* as a new domain that must be purified. The cyber-world is a new '*dar*' in jihad policy, and thus a new objective and work place of terror.

To conlclude, through actions performed in cyber media, ISIS have discovered an area where they can fight with the state authorities and even the "big Western evil allies" they oppose to in the world as an Islamic organization and as equals in their geography for the first time in history.

This area hosts two equals, and is the place of balance which Islam lost centuries ago. Only a simple modem is required for these attacks. Now, the materials used by terrorism are modems that can provide faster Internet connection, new documents in downloadable zipped files, and virus codes that can spread around the world in a moment. The role models of young Muslims are the green hackers who transfer money from bank accounts in the countries that are thought to be safe (using Badr tactic) or hack the websites of Israeli ministries as well as their older *mujahid* brothers who bombed the American military vehicles and bases in Iraq.

Cyber media can raise even its simplest claim for power regarding time to the status of "seeing/interfering without being seen", which is the highest stage of a victorious struggle for power. This is a much stronger pressure than the look of the non-existent sniper *mujahid* or the one who disciplines us without being behind a sand mound in Iraq or the destroyed buildings in a bombed, empty district in northern Syria who we think is looking at us, because that *mujahid* is now looking at the Swiss bank accounts of big companies that manage the global system and/or the 'clouds' of big informatics firms. In this context, jihad is being transformed for the first time into a struggle above the previously known ways of jihad between two invisible powers who are fighting from behind their already established rules rather than the sides of an unequal war. This both helped a new field to emerge where Islam reached a balance point it had lost in 1492 and destroyed the huge imbalance of electronically controlled missiles and the primeval fighters with beards and Kalashnikovs which Habermas also regards as "a morally disgusting view". (Borradori n.d.) Jihad has leaked into the cyber world and has shown that the reasons creating this 'moral' imbalance can be eliminated and a battle which is as balanced as possible can be had without making it a problem for Islam.

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