Kebebasan Juru Audit sebagai Pemoderat dalam Hubungan antara Kualiti Audit dengan Pengurusan Perolehan

Facultas Ekonomi
Universitas Sriwijaya
Jalan Raya Palembang-Prabumi KM32
Ogan Ilir, Sumatera Selatan
Indonesia


Pusat Pengajian Perakaunan
Fakulti Ekonomi dan Perniagaan
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
43600 UKM Bangi, Selangor D.E.
Malaysia


Pusat Pengajian Perakaunan
Fakulti Ekonomi dan Perniagaan
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
43600 UKM Bangi, Selangor D.E.
Malaysia


Abstract

This research examines the effect of auditor’s independence on the relationship between audit quality and earnings management. Data were based on 131 companies from eight industries listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange for the period from 1998 to 2001. The study finds a significant relationship between audit quality and earnings management. The level of earnings management of companies audited by audit firms of high quality (Big) is lower than that of companies audited by audit firms of low quality (non-Big). The independence variable, measured by provision of non-audit service, failed to moderate this relationship whereas the moderating independence variable, measured by auditor’s tenure could influence companies to manage their earnings. This means the effect of audit quality on earnings management practice could be moderated by how long the audit firm has been the company’s auditor.

Keywords

Citation

Meutia, I., Abd Latiff, R., & Jaffar, R. (2004). Kebebasan Juru Audit sebagai Pemoderat dalam Hubungan antara Kualiti Audit dengan Pengurusan Perolehan. Jurnal Pengurusan, 23, 73–95.

@article{abdlatiff2004kebebasan,
  title={Kebebasan Juru Audit sebagai Pemoderat dalam Hubungan antara Kualiti Audit dengan Pengurusan Perolehan},
  author={Meutia, Inten and Abd Latiff, Radziah and Jaffar, Romlah},
  journal={Jurnal Pengurusan},
 

volume={23},
  number={},
  pages={73—95},
  year={2004},
  doi={},
  publisher={Penerbit UKM},
}

Export Bibliography:


   

Article received:  
Accepted for publication:  
Available online: 

Issue logo

23 (2004) 73 – 95


Share via:


Receive updates when new articles are published